3-GORBACHEV+Javeri,+Amir

Chosen - EFFECT ON MEDIA AND JOURNALISM =Gorbachev’s Reform and its Effects on Soviet Journalism =

Condensed for Notes – Heavy on Details
Friction generated between CPSU (Communist Party of Soviet Union) and the falling of its monopoly over media Alternatives to traditional soviet media (alternatives meaning video cassettes, non-state radio broadcasts, hand copy literature, and more people to people contacts) meant the USSR’s hold on media and journalism was falling. Glasnost, specifically, was responsible for a sort of “ideology rehabilitation” of Soviet Media (McNair). In a speech given 10 December 1984, Gorbachev outlined why Glasnost was necessary for the Soviet Union, shown below;

… is an integral aspect of socialist democracy and a norm of all public life. Extensive, timely and candid information is an indication of trust in people and of respect for their intelligence, feelings and ability to comprehend various events on their own… Glasnost in the work of the Party and state agencies is an effective means of combating bureaucratic distortions and obliges people to take a more thought approach to … the rectification of shortcoming and deficiencies. In large part the persuasiveness of propaganda … depends on this. (Gorbachev) (I literally transcribed this from a textbook, so the link to the TEXTBOOK is below, considering that the speech, transcribed, does not exist)

As Gorbachev became Gen Secretary of CPSU, he launched the Glastnost campaign to allow what he called a “socialist pluralism of opinions” to be facilitated by the populous.

Of course, while actively open citizens of the CPSU were in agreement with glasnost policymaking, there were some of the higher class/elite who saw external issues. For Example, the Krasnaya Zvezda saw slow but [some considered] damaging criticism of the military. Retired Colonel Vasily Gukin commented that in February of 1988, the editorial collective had gone beyond the necessity of detail required in order to effectively criticize the government, by point out that “enemies [of the state] will be studying [critical articles] literally with a magnifying glass” in search of weakness or loopholes in the defensive capabilities of the state. Indeed, the open nature of criticism allowed by Gorbachevs Glastnost was a sparring area at times for overtly flagrant critiques.

In terms of Journalism and the economy, the liberating nature of glastnost meant that economic news had been greatly restructured, and that an increasing amount of negative economic criticism came, mostly focused on the defects of the top down gov managerialism of the economic wellbeing of Russia.

In 1988, the upswing of news popularity (resulting from Glastnost) meant that shortages in publishing materials became an issue. Some accuses authorities or state members of artificially creating these shortages in order to limit the audience critical literature could reach and persuade.

Works Cited
McNair, Brian. __Glasnost, Perestroika and the Soviet Media__. Taylor and Francis, 2002.

Document Below is a different line of the document transcribed with the same text, and different analysis

"**Profound Transformations" Are Called For**

To everyone inside the Kremlin, it was clear that Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko was seriously ill; his shortness of breath, a result of emphysema, was impossible to disguise. He had barely got his feet under the table as new general secretary when the jockeying began as to who would succeed him. Those who favoured a return to the stable, good old days of Brezhnev tried to pressure Chernenko into halting Andropov's reforms. Those who favoured reform lost heart; the new leader was spiritless and wavered between factions. Often he was too ill to attend Politburo meetings, and at fifteen minutes' notice the head of the secretariat would be asked to take the chair. This was Mikhail Gorbachev, who more than anyone else represented a new way for­ward. The old guard resented his position and ganged up against him. As his illness got worse, Chernenko had difficulty in speaking and breathing and ceased to appear in public. He was too ill to deliver his annual election address to the Politburo, but there was no democratic process by which he could be removed. A sick and senile person could still sit at the top of the Soviet pyra­mid for as long as his closest colleagues chose to put up with him.

On 10 December 1984 Gorbachev gave a major speech on ideology to a party conference. Firmly nailing his colours to the mast of reform, Gorbachev introduced two new concepts to the party lexicon: //perestroika,// reconstruction or restructuring, and //glasnost,// openness or transparency. He declared, "Pro­found transformations must be carried out in the economy and the entire sys­tem of social relations, and a qualitatively higher standard of living must be ensured for the Soviet people.... //Glasnost is// an integral part of a socialist democracy. Frank information is evidence of confidence in the people and respect for their intelligence and feelings, and for their ability to understand events for themselves." Gorbachev was the reformers' man. But within the Politburo, the reformers were in a minority.

<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman',serif; font-size: 12pt;">On the evening of 10 March 1985, Chernenko died, the third aged party leader to die in three years. The Politburo moved quickly to settle the succes­sion; a meeting was called for 11:00 PM that night. Andrei Gromyko, the first to get to his feet, proposed Gorbachev. The next to speak, Nikolai Tikhonov, the eighty-year-old chairman of the Council of Ministers, was the most conserva­tive opponent of reform, but he too supported Gorbachev's nomination, "with­out reservation." Gorbachev, age fifty-four, was elected unanimously. This was the Soviet way of doing things. The old men had decided that younger leader­ship was needed. At a Communist Party plenum the following day, to ratify the succession, there was a barely disguised sense of relief that power was passing to a younger man. Gorbachev's name provoked thunderous applause. After receiving the unanimous acclaim of the party, Gorbachev made a speech out­lining his programme. He spoke of the need for the Soviet Union to "move for­ward" into a system of socialism with more democracy and social consciousness, and of the need for greater openness - glasnost. On foreign pol­icy, Gorbachev announced, "We want to stop and not to continue the arms race, and consequently propose to freeze nuclear arsenals and stop further deployment of missiles." Gorbachev's election marked a new beginning - and the beginning of the end for both the Cold War and the Soviet Union.

<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman',serif; font-size: 12pt;">Within days, copies of Gorbachev's speech were in circulation. At Chernenko's state funeral, Vice President George Bush and Secretary of State George Shultz represented the United States. They had a brief meeting with Gorbachev and came away knowing they had met a Soviet leader very differ­ent from any they had encountered before. When they reported back to President Reagan, all agreed this was a potentially significant moment for US­Soviet relations. Within days, the president, talking more positively, an­nounced, "We're ready to work with the Soviet Union for more constructive relations." Reagan still talked tough, insisting on the importance of space weapons in his SDI initiative, but he also said he thought it was "high time" for a summit with his Soviet counterpart.

<span style="font-family: 'Times New Roman',serif; font-size: 12pt;">Available @ http://homepages.stmartin.edu/fac_staff/rlangill/PLS%20310/Gorbachev.htm